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ABSTRACT
It is generally accepted that failure to reason correctly
during the early stages of software development causes
developers to make incorrect decisions which can lead
to the introduction of faults or anomalies in systems.
Most key development decisions are usually made at
the early system specication stage of a software pro-
ject and developers do not receive feedback on their ac-
curacy until near its completion. Software metrics are
generally aimed at the coding or testing stages of devel-
opment, however, when the repercussions of erroneous
work have already been incurred. This paper presents
a tentative model for predicting those parts of formal
specications which are most likely to admit erroneous
inferences, in order that potential sources of human er-
ror may be reduced. The empirical data populating the
model was generated during a series of cognitive experi-
ments aimed at identifying linguistic properties of the Z
notation which are prone to admit non-logical reasoning
errors and biases in trained users.
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1 Introduction
There are three main questions which form the basis for
the research discussed in this paper:
 How does the actual performance of software engin-
eers dier from that which is expected (or claimed)
when they are undertaking reasoning tasks using
formal notations?
 Do the results of experiments conducted by cog-
nitive psychologists into the reasoning performance
of general populations with natural language carry
across into a population of software engineers using
formalisms?
 Can we nd systematic reasoning errors that can
be predicted by attributes of the task undertaken
or the person performing the task and, if so, can we
use this information to build predictive metrics for
reasoning performance in software specication?
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These questions are related, in that they seek to address
aspects of the problem noted by Fenton and Kaposi [7,
p.293] nearly a decade ago:
\In the absence of a suitable measurement system,
there is no chance of validating the claims of the
formal methods community that their models and
theories enhance the quality of software products
and improve the cost-eectiveness of software
processes".
Moreover, the methodology adopted for seeking tentat-
ive answers to these questions attempts to address the
concerns of Craigen et al. [2, p.407]:
\One diculty we encountered in determining the
relative advantage of formal methods is the lack of
strong scientic evidence that the technology is, in
fact, eective. Various surveys have provided reas-
onably systematic anecdotal evidence of eective
industrial use of formal methods. However, none of
the formal methods application projects has used
strict, scientically based, measurement data".
It is important to stress that the scope of this research is
novel and ambitious, and that the current results com-
prise more of a \proof of concept" than a set of ndings
to be widely used by the community of practitioners.
It is our hope that the experiments we have carried out
are scientic in the sense that they are repeatable (which
is usually not the case for anecdotal, case study based
exercises), and also in the sense that we have used an
existing \tried and tested" body of knowledge to permit
predictions of hypotheses to be refuted or supported. It
is also scientic in the sense that we make no claims
for \truth", rather we present some results that others
might attempt to refute, thereby extending knowledge
and understanding in the eld.
In the rest of this paper we will outline the method-
ology for the research, present a small sample of the
results, and illustrate how we have used these to pro-
duce a predictive measure for human error in reasoning
about specications.
2 Methodology
In order to render the research questions suciently
concrete for empirical analysis, a notation had to be se-
lected in which to express the tasks. A detailed review of
twenty possible notations was undertaken to inform this
decision [16]. Z was selected from these as a notation
with a stable standard for syntax and a suciently large
user community from which to recruit participants for
the experiments. Whilst this inevitably leads to some
loss of generality, Z is suciently similar to many other
notations (at least, in the features we use in our re-
search) that we would anticipate the results holding if
other notations are used, and checking this empirically
would be a simple (if resource intensive) matter.
A small scale pilot study was used to rene both the
experimental methodology and the questions being ex-
plored [17]. Two tentative results that came out of this
study are of relevance here:
 Even when experienced software engineers knew
that they were participating in an experiment to
study their reasoning errors, errors occurred. For
example, in one task every participant made the
same error when translating a simple piece of
formal specication into English. This endorsed
the view of the researchers that claims for the use
of formal methods as generally applicable techno-
logy to improve reasoning performance should not
be taken at face value.
 The errors made in reasoning performance were sys-
tematic, in the sense that there appeared to be
some property in each task which led to several par-
ticipants making the same error. Moreover, there
appeared to be a high correspondence between the
performance we observed and that predicted by the
numerous experiments reported in the psycholo-
gical literature on human reasoning, even though
we were formalising the tasks and using parti-
cipants experienced in these sorts of tasks.
As a result of this pilot study several larger scale empir-
ical studies were proposed, and to date four have been
conducted. The decision was taken to focus attention
initially on three factors which the pilot study suggested
might inuence reasoning performance.
 The length of time that the participants had spent
using Z. This was coupled with a reective judge-
ment on expertise level.
 The extent to which the specication is \abstract",
that is, devoid of thematic content, rather than sug-
gesting realistic concepts.
 The logical constructs used in the specication.
With respect to this third factor, logical operators were
chosen with roughly equivalent meanings to those nat-
ural language constructs which have been shown to
evoke erroneous reasoning in cognitive studies: ) (if), ^
(and), _ (or), : (not), 9 (some) and 8 (all). The studies
focussed on reasoning with: conditionals, disjunctives,
conjunctives and quantiers. Negation was not treated
separately, but was incorporated into all four studies in
a systematic fashion.
A total of one hundred and twenty people took part in
the experiments, all of whom had some knowledge of
the Z formal notation and training in logical deduction.
These consisted of sta and students from various aca-
demic institutions, and computing professionals from in-
dustrial software companies. Participants comprised 72
sta, 26 students, and 22 professionals. Their mean age
was 33.55 years (s = 9.83) and 110 had studied at least
one system of formal logic beforehand, such as the pro-
positional or predicate calculi. Their mean level of Z
experience was 4.63 years (s = 4.04). According to par-
ticipants' ratings of expertise, the experimental groups
comprised 31 novice, 54 procient and 35 expert users
of the Z notation. The groups were counter balanced,
rst, according to these ratings of expertise and, second,
according to their lengths of Z experience.
Participants were divided into two groups for each ex-
periment, abstract formal logic (AFL) and thematic
formal logic (TFL), with twenty dierent participants
completing the tasks under each linguistic condition.
The stimuli for each task comprised a prose description
and several Z statements, at least one of which con-
tained a logical rule. These represented the premisses
necessary for the inference to be drawn. Participants
were also shown four Z statements representing possible
conclusions, one of which denoted \No valid conclusion"
or \Nothing", depending on the context.
For illustrative purposes we will present an overview
of the experiment carried out on conditional reasoning,
and provide two examples of tasks. There are four clas-
sical forms used in the discussion of conditional reason-
ing. Two of these, Modus Ponens (MP) and Modus
Tollens (MT), permit valid conclusions to be drawn.
The other two do not permit valid conclusions, and are
usually labelled by the fallacies that arise if conclusions
are drawn erroneously, Denial of the Antecedent (DA)
and Armation of the Consequent (AC). For each of
these four forms, the two terms involved can be presen-
ted in armative (A) or negative (N) polarity. This
gives rise to the sixteen tasks covering all possible com-
binations in the following table.
TABLE 1
Logical forms of the conditional inference tasks
Polarity MP MT DA AC
AA p ) q ,
p
) q
p ) q ,
:q
) :p
p ) q ,
:p
) :q
p ) q ,
q
) p
AN p ) :q ,
p
) :q
p ) :q ,
q
) :p
p ) :q ,
:p
) q
p ) :q ,
:q
) p
NA :p ) q ,
:p
) q
:p ) q ,
:q
) p
:p ) q ,
p
) :q
:p ) q ,
q
) :p
NN :p ) :q ,
:p
) :q
:p ) :q ,
q
) p
:p ) :q ,
p
) q
:p ) :q ,
:q
) :p
Note: Conclusions shown for DA and AC are fallacious.
Two versions of each task were formulated in order to
test for possible eects of realistic material; one ex-
pressed in abstract terms and one in thematic terms. All
abstract tasks described relations between colours and
shapes, whereas the thematic tasks described realistic
computing applications including: a library database
system, a ight reservation system, a missile guidance
system, a video lending system, and a vending machine
operation. The abstract version of the AC-AN task, for
example, was presented as shown below. An asterisk
indicates the logically correct conclusion.
If colour
0
6= blue after its execution, what can
you say about the value of shape before operation
SetColour has executed?
SetColour
ShapeAndColour
(shape = circle)) (colour
0
6= blue)
shape
0
= shape
(a) shape 6= rectangle
(b) shape = circle
(c) shape 6= circle
(d)

Nothing
Figure 1: Abstract conditional AC-AN inference
The thematic version of the AC-AN task was expressed
terms of a nuclear reactor control program, as shown
below.
If :(reactor status! = Ok) after its execution,
what can you say about coolertemp before operation
ReactorTempCheck has executed?
ReactorTempCheck
NuclearPlantStatus
reactor status! : Report
coolertemp > Maxtemp ) :(reactor status! = Ok)
(a) coolertemp 6 Maxtemp
(b) coolertemp > Maxtemp
(c) coolertemp > Mintemp
(d)

Nothing
Figure 2: Thematic conditional AC-AN inference
The same basic form was used for all four studies, which
were administered separately over a period of two years.
All participants were recruited via personal invitation.
They were not supervised in completing the tasks, and
were not put under time pressure. We should acknow-
ledge the role played by these participants, who were
prepared to give up their time to make this research
possible, eectively sitting an examination which was
intellectually quite demanding with no obvious benet
to themselves.
3 Results
Each of the four experiments yielded data on the per-
formance of participants undertaking a set of tasks, for
either the abstract or thematic condition. This was
analysed together with the participants' length of ex-
perience and level of expertise. Predictions were made
regarding the expected outcomes, mainly by reference
to the psychological literature. Many of these predic-
tions were conrmed, although some were refuted - a
detailed account can be found elsewhere [17]. To illus-
trate the sort of results obtained, here are some holistic
features for the conditional reasoning experiment, and
a few snapshots of results that we considered \interest-
ing", although we would warn of the dangers of taking
these out of context. It is important to stress that, as
well as analysing the numbers of correct responses, we
were also interested in the occasions where several parti-
cipants made the same incorrect response, as that would
indicate systematic errors, such as those suggested in
the psychological literature. Moreover, such systematic
errors may well be overlooked within project teams us-
ing techniques such as walk-throughs or peer review.
Participants' levels of correctness under each experi-
mental condition in the conditional reasoning task re-
vealed overall rank orders as follows: AFL (79%)< TFL
(90%) for group type, DA (73%) < MT (83%) < AC
(85%) < MP (98%) for inference type, and NA (81%)
< NN (85%) = AA (85%) < AN (88%) for polarity
type. Analyses of variance revealed a signicant main
eect of inference type (F
(3;114)
= 7:53; p < 0:01), and
a signicant interaction between inference and group
type (F
(3;114)
= 2:64; p = 0:05). Analyses by linear re-
gression revealed signicant correlations between par-
ticipants' lengths of Z experience and their levels of
correctness (R = 0:41;F
(1;39)
= 7:82; p < 0:01), and
between their Z expertise ratings and levels of correct-
ness (R = 0:45;F
(1;39)
= 9:40; p < 0:01). A summary of
participants' valid conditional inferences is given in the
appendix of this paper.
The results suggest that few participants experienced
any diculty whatsoever in drawing the MP inference,
with near ceiling levels observed for all combinations of
premiss polarity across both groups. This is supported
by natural language based studies in which participants
rarely erred when drawing MP inferences, irrespective
of the term polarities [3, 5, 14] and the realistic con-
tent involved [8, 12]. The lower rates of correct MT
inferences drawn in comparison to MP is also well sup-
ported [5, 14]. The results suggest that participants
experienced some diculty in drawing DA inferences,
where up to 30% succumbed to the fallacy, and that
participants experienced most diculty in drawing the
AC inferences where up to 45% succumbed to the fal-
lacy. The high rates at which participants succumbed to
these fallacies when reasoning about abstract material,
in particular, is also supported in the cognitive literat-
ure [4, 14]. A brief summary of the results in relation
to cognitive theories of conditional reasoning biases is
given below - readers are referred to [17] for a detailed
discussion.
 Signs of matching bias [3] were evident for the falla-
cious DA and AC inferences in the abstract group.
 Signs of negative conclusion bias [6] were evident
for the MT, DA and AC inferences in the abstract
group.
 Signs of facilitation by realism [9] and belief bias
[1] were evident in the thematic group.
 No signs of armative premiss bias [6].
It is important to stress that the results above relate
only to one study. It is tempting to overgeneralise
these ndings. For example, one might use these results
to endorse the prejudice that formalisation which loses
thematic content is damaging to reasoning performance
in general. Unfortunately, the other studies would not
support this view as, on many tasks, the abstract group
performed better than the thematic one. These studies
served to conrm our predicted answers to two of the
research questions:
 Even experienced software engineers make large
numbers of errors when reasoning about specic-
ations expressed in a formal notation.
 The nature of the errors seem to correspond very
well in general with the systematic errors reported
by psychologists working with a general population
using natural language.
It is argued that people nd it easier to reason with
formal expressions than their informal counterparts
[15, 18]. Our results suggest that claims for formalisa-
tion such as this, which rest upon strong psychological
assumptions, are dicult to support. In some specic
areas, however, the use of formal methods (or the back-
ground of the participants in this study) does seem to
improve matters.
4 A Predictive Model of Error
The results obtained so far allow us to proceed to the
nal part of the research program: using the data collec-
ted to explore the possibility of constructing predictive
models which will allow us to predict the likelihood of
errors being made by a particular individual working
on a particular problem. Once again we will illustrate
the technique by reference to the study of conditional
reasoning.
In order to quantify how far each variable contributed to
participants' levels of performance, a logistic regression
analysis was used to model the data points generated.
The table below shows that the variance in participants'
correctness was accounted for, rst, by the reasoner's
level of expertise then, second, by the type of inference
to be drawn and, third, by the degree of meaningful con-
tent in task material. The 
2
values may be interpreted
as the improvements to the accuracy of the model's pre-
dictions each time a signicant variable was added as a
parameter to the model in a forward stepwise manner.
Although the accuracy of a logistic regression model's
predictions generally increases along with the number of
input parameters it allows, there comes a point at which
the inclusion of new parameters does not improve the
accuracy of the model signicantly. This explains why
polarity type has been excluded as a parameter from
the model and a \t" to the observed data has been
achieved using only three parameters: expertise level,
inference type and material type.
TABLE 2
Improvements made to the conditional
model by stepwise addition of variables
Step 
2
Improvement DF p Variable Added
1 53.64 2 < 0.01 Expertise Level
2 47.37 3 < 0.01 Inference Type
3 12.55 1 < 0.01 Material Type
One measure of how well a regression based model ts its
data is to classify the proportion of predictions given by
the model which are consistent with the observed data
points from which the model was generated [11]. The
\Classication-t" for our model is 87.81%. Given that
only 12.19% of our data points were misclassied, this
suggests that the model provides a reasonable t to the
data. An alternative measure, called the \Goodness-
of-t", compares the observed probabilities with those
predicted by the model [11]. Using this measure it is
possible to calculate the \Percentage of variability" in
the data accounted for by the model. This is obtained
by dividing the sum of the input parameters' improve-
ments to the model by the Goodness-of-t value for the
model with no explanatory input parameters. This cal-
culation tells us that 18% variance in the observed data
is predictable by our model.
A logistic regression analysis generated the results
shown below. This table shows: how our signicant
experimental variables became encoded as input para-
meters to the model, their relative contributions to par-
ticipants' correctness (), the standard error (SE), the
degrees of freedom (DF), and their signicance (p). 
x
is the variable mean, calculated as the summation of
the  values for each factor in the variable, divided by
the number of factors in the variable. The regression
constant, Const , refers to the overall mean probability
of being correct independent of the inuence from other
variables.
TABLE 3
Parameters in the model of conditional reasoning
Factor Parameter  SE DF p 
x
Abstract
Material
M 1 -0.8794 0.25 1 < 0.01 -0.4397
MP
Inference
I 1 2.9167 0.55 1 < 0.01 1.1197
MT
Inference
I 2 0.7010 0.30 1 0.02 1.1197
DA
Inference
I 3 0.8610 0.31 1 0.01 1.1197
Novice
Expertise
E1 -1.7765 0.40 1 < 0.01 -0.5991
Procient
Expertise
E2 -0.0207 0.45 1 0.96 -0.5991
Const 2.4588 0.20 1 < 0.01
The  estimates yielded by a logistic regression show
the extent to which each of their corresponding factors
inuence the dependent variable. In the context of our
reasoning studies, as  increases in value so does the
participants' likelihood of being correct under the cor-
responding experimental condition. These values rep-
resent the parameters for our conditional model of in-
ferential complexity. According to [10], the \odds" of an
event occurring are calculated by the probability that it
will occur divided by the probability that it will not.
The summation of the  estimates give the log of the
odds, or \logit" value, as shown in the following general
formula.
logit(Material ; Inference;Expertise) =
Const + 
M1
+ 
I1
+ 
I2
+ 
I3
+ 
E1
+ 
E2
The following examples demonstrate how the formula
can be applied to calculate the logit values for condi-
tional inferences under a range of conditions. They also
illustrate how the calculations are always performed re-
lative to the regression constant.
logit(Abstract ;MP ;Novice) =
(Const + 
M1
+ 
I1
+ 
E1
)  (
Mx
+ 
Ix
+ 
Ex
)
logit(Abstract ;DA;Expert) =
(Const + 
M1
+ 
I3
)  (
Mx
+ 
Ix
+ 
Ex
)
logit(Thematic;AC ;Expert) =
Const   (
Mx
+ 
Ix
+ 
Ex
)
The model developed thus far provides a means by
which the users of formal methods can predict the like-
lihood that a reasoner of a given expertise will draw an
inference of a given type about a given type of logical
statement expressed in a given degree of thematic ma-
terial. At present the model yields logit values which
appear to have little meaning in isolation. What we are
lacking is a means for translating these values into ab-
solute probabilities (0  p  1). The following formula
performs the necessary translation [11].
p =
e
z
1+e
z
: : : where z is the logit value, and e is the
exponential function.
Similar models have been produced from the results of
the other three studies.
5 A Brief Demonstration
Let us consider how these predictive models might be
used in practice. We can envisage Will Wise, a senior
software developer working on a defence based project,
having been presented with the operational specication
for a guided missile system, shown as follows. Suppose
that Will is asked by his team leader to determine the
implications of including schema MissileStatus within
schema MissileCheck .
[COORDS ]
MESSAGE ::= Hit j Miss
MissileStatus
current ; target : COORDS
report : MESSAGE
report
0
= Hit
MissileCheck
MissileStatus
current 6= target ) report = Miss
Figure 3: Thematic Z specication for a missile system
Given that the specication is expressed in realistic ma-
terial, whose variable identiers refer to rather fast mov-
ing animate objects, we can safely classify its material as
being thematic in nature. Supposing Will had acquired
a fair amount of Z experience by formally verifying part
of a previous project, had studied several systems of
logic at university and had even gone on expensive Z
training courses, we might be inclined to regard Will
as an expert Z user. If we were to analyse the logic of
the terms involved we would see that the consequent of
a conditional rule is being denied, which suggests that
Will is being invited to draw a modus tollens inference.
We now have the three parameters that we need to apply
our model of conditional reasoning: the material type
(Thematic), the type of inference to be drawn (MT),
and the Z expertise of the reasoner (Expert). The ques-
tion that we must ask is: How likely is Will to infer
the logically correct conclusion, current = target , un-
der these conditions? Application of the model predicts
that Will is 95.6% likely to draw this conclusion, which
is calculated as follows.
To calculate logit(Thematic;MT ;Expert):
z = (Const + 
I2
)  (
Mx
+ 
Ix
+ 
Ex
)
z = (2:4588+ 0:7010)  ( 0:4397+ 1:1197  0:5991)
z = 3:0789
To translate into an absolute probability:
p = e
z
=(1 + e
z
)
p = e
3:0789
=(1 + e
3:0789
)
p = 0:9560
Now suppose that the same specication and instruc-
tions had been given to Sam Slow, a new recruit and
self-professed \novice" Z user. Suppose also that the
specication given to Sam was not expressed in them-
atic material at all, but used single letters for variable
names seemingly bearing little relation to real world ob-
jects, as shown below.
[C ]
M ::= m1 j m2
MS
p; q : C
r : M
r
0
= m1
MC
MS
p 6= q ) r = m2
Figure 4: Abstract Z specication for the missile system
How would these changes aect Sam's ability to infer
the logical conclusion, p = q? In the absence of a stat-
istical method, most software engineers would make a
subjective, educated guess based on their intuitive feel-
ings towards the situation. The scope of the model is
fortunately sucient to account for such factors and can
provide us with a much more quantiably precise es-
timate. The question arises, however, of whether Sam's
team leader would be prepared to risk the 35% dieren-
tial in probability that Sam would not reach the same
logical conclusion as Will, given the criticality of the in-
ference. Now consider the revised version of our missile
system's formal specication shown below.
MissileStatus
current ; target : COORDS
report : MESSAGE
report
0
= Hit
MissileCheck
MissileStatus
report = Hit ) current = target
Figure 5: Revised Z specication for the missile system
If we analyse the logic of the terms following the schema
inclusion we see that the antecedent of the conditional
is being armed, which suggests that a much sim-
pler, modus ponens, inference is required. Suppos-
ing Will and Sam are asked to determine the implic-
ations of the schema inclusion, the model predicts that
their potential for failing to draw the logical conclusion,
current = target , has decreased to just 0.5% and 2.9%
respectively. It should now be clear that application of
the model has strong implications for the ways in which
formal specications are written and for the levels of ex-
pertise acquired by those people who work with them.
6 Conclusions
We have hopefully illustrated that a scientic approach
to the questions posed at the outset of this paper is both
possible and fruitful. The experiments are repeatable
and easily extended, to add condence (or refutation)
and generalisation. The predictive metrics appear to
have most of the desirable properties suggested in the
literature [13], although space has not allowed us to il-
lustrate this, and are easily applied to simple problems.
There are, however, still many important issues that
need addressing before this sort of approach can be seen
as approaching an industrial strength tool. We have
dealt with simple logical constructs, but have not yet
tackled the problems of compound constructs, involving
several layers of nested forms. Little work has been done
on this in the cognitive psychology community either,
and so we will be attempting experiments with little
experience to build upon. Similarly, we need to address
alternative types of formal method, such as process al-
gebras, whose structure does not map so easily onto lo-
gical reasoning in natural language. We see no reason,
however, why such areas should not be put on a rm sci-
entic basis in the fullness of time. Hopefully this paper
will also lead to the research community raising many
more such questions that can be tackled in a scientic
manner.
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